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T H E growing popularity of public boating and related water-basedrecreation is increasingly taxing the capacity of available lakes and
strearns.! As a result, accelerating demands have been made for public
use of otherwise unavailable, "private" bodies of water." Although
existing 'economic 'and governmental mechanisms to expand recre-
ational opportunities may be adequate in theory, they have failed to
*Associate Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School. A.B.
(1969) ; J.D. (1973), University of Michigan. While the author accepts full re-
sponsibility for this Article, the thoughtful comments of friends and colleagues
led to many improvements. Special thanks in' this regard are owed to Joe Sax,
Charles Donahue, Zyg Plater, and John Dernbach. Also, my present and former
research assistants,Beth' Lowery, Paula Weinbaum, and Sue Patton, must be
cited for their many helpful efforts.
t © 1980by Robert Haskell.Abrams.
1 U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 23, 1977, at 62-63; see A. JUBENVILLE, OUT-
DOOR RECREATION PLANNING 80-82 (1976);' MICHIGAN DEP'T OF NATURAL RE-
SOURCES, MICHIGAN RECREATION PLAN 20-32 (1975). .
A recently published article offers statistical data from the state of Wisconsin
which helps to put the magnitude of recreational water use in perspective:
As of December 31, 1976, there were 10,478 sailboats, 284,905 motor-
boats under 16 feet, 81;217 motorboats 16-26 feet, 2,322 motor boats
26-40 feet, 294'n1otor boats 40-65 feet, and 17 motor boats over 65 feet
registered with the DNR 'pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 30.51' (1975). In
addition, there are unknown numbers of sailboats under 12 feet, gov-
ernment boats, canoes and other boats not propelled by machinery
which are exempt from-registration. Wis. Stat: §§ 30.50(2) and 30.51
(1975). DNR, REPORT OF CERTIFICATES OF NUMBER ISSUED TO BOATS,
U.S.e.G.Form CGHQ 3923. Over the last ten years, there has been a
125% growth in ownership of recreational boats. The increased num-
ber and .horsepower of recreational boats logically lead to additional
speed, congestion and accidents on Wisconsin's navigable waters.
Whipple, Recreational Boatinq Law in Wisconsin, 61· MARQ. L. REV. 425 n.2
(1978).
2 See text accompanying notes 144-47 ilfjra.
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respond to these new demands coherently." This Article proposes that
government enjoys additional power to increase the public's opportunity
for water-based recreation.
The purpose of this Article is to lay a comprehensive, doctrinal
foundation for broad governmental action. Simultaneously, this Article
counsels a substantial degree of governmental self-restraint. Accord-
ingly, the Article is in two parts. Part I describes a coherent theory
of public recreational water rights applicable to all natural existing
waters,' including those currently viewed as wholly private." Part II
describes the limits of public recreational opportunities. In particular,
it advocates limiting recreational rights when necessary to afford
environmental protection of lakes and streams or to insure fair treat-
ment of private landowners. Moreover, Part II suggests that gov-
ernment undertake affirmative planning, regulatory, and enforcement
obligations when it increases public access to and use of recreational
waters.
I
PUBLIC RIGHTS TO RECREATIONALLY VALUABLE WATERS
A. The Nature of the Proposed Doctrine
The central tenet of this Article is that all naturally existing, recre-
ationally valuable waters are available for public recreational use. Al-
though public rights are not without their limitations," they may per-
tain to any natural body of water. Thus, public recreational water rights
could attach to large rivers and small mountain streams, to intercon-
nected waterways and isolated lakes, to waters surrounded by private
homes and those bounded by commercial development. The touchstone
for public recreational rights is the suitability of the water for recre-
ation. If a waterbody is recreationally valuable, then public rights apply.
The uniformity with which this Article formulates public recreational
rights contrasts sharply with the varied, often confusing, theories upon
3 See generally text accompanying notes 7-13 infra.
4 This would not include artificially created waterbodies, Such waters are
neither within the reach of the tradition which establishes common rights of use,
nor are they within the class of waters which are appropriate for government
action.
S Little emphasis will be placed on distinguishing lake-based recreation and
littoral rights from streams and riparianism, nor will effort be made to account for
the special problems arising in those states which reject riparianism in favor of
prior appropriation. The pure appropriation states are Arizona, Colorado, Idaho,
Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming. See 1 WATERS AND WATER
RIGHTS § 4.1, at 31 (R. Clark ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited as CLARK TREATISE].
The states with mixed systems are California, Kansas, Nebraska, North Dakota,
Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, and Washington. 1 W. HUTCHINS,
WATER RIGHTS LAWS IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN STATES 206-25 (1971).
G See text accompanying notes 195-200 infra.
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which public rights currently depend." Apart from the federal naviga-
tion servitude.f most water rights are creations of state law. Among the
states, local topographic, economic, and historic differences have led to
a rich doctrinal diversity. Public water rights, for example, may depend
on the type and size of the water, the local definition of navigibility, or
even the configuration of bed ownership." Although the public invari-
ably enjoys rights in waters used for commercial navigation,'? public
rights in other waters are less certain.'! Moreover, almost every state
recognizes private rights of use or proprietorship in the owners of some
submerged or adjacent fast lands. These private rights may carry the
power to exclude others from the waters.P The resulting restrictions, in
addition to uncertain state definitions of public rights, function to limit
public enjoyment of recreationally valuable inland waters.P
This Article seeks to replace the diverse, and often unnecessarily re-
strictive, theories which currently define the public's recreational water
rights with a theory which stresses that public recreational rights are
a function of the recreational value of the water. Although this view
already enjoys limited recognition in American water law,14 its con-
sonance with Anglo-American traditions and theories of property com-
mend its broader application.
7 A need for such uniformity is well recognized:
The cases on the private right of use of waters where the beds are
privately owned show a remarkable diversity of rule as well as theory.
There are probably few areas of law in which similar problems have
arisen in the several states where the courts have split so widely, or
based their decisions on such diverse theories.
Johnson & Austin, Recreational Rights and Titles to Beds on Western Lakes and
Streams, 7 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1, 33 (1967).
S Some preliminary explanation may be helpful for those not already familiar
with the servitude. Federal regulation of inland and coastal waters derives from
the commerce power, and apart from allowing regulation of vessels and trade, it
also allows regulation of navigable waters and the lands beneath them. See gener-
ally CLARK TREATISE, supra note 5, § 37.2(c), at 208--09 nn.34-36 and cases cited
therein. The existence of this federal power to prohibit state and private activities
inconsistent with the needs of commercial navigation is usually referred to as the
navigation servitude. See, e.q., United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121, 123 (1967).
9 See text accompanying notes 37-82 infra.
10 See generally Stone, Public Rights in Water Uses and Private Rights in
Land Adjacent to Water, in CLARK TREATISE, supra note 5, §§ 35-44.4, at 177-280.
11 See generally text accompanying notes 51-82 infra.
12 See FARNHAM, WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 1618 (1904) ; cf. Stone, supra
note 10, § 37.4(A), at 213--17 (implying that such rights continue to exist).
13 Ci, C. CICCHETII, J. SENECA & P. DAVIDSON, THE DEMAND & SUPPLY OF
OUTDOOR RECREATION (1969) (assessing shortfall of water recreation opportuni-
ties) ; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR HERITAGE CONSERVATION AND RECREATION
SERVICE, NATIONAL URBAN RECREATION STUDY (1978) (detailing the shortfall of
adequate water recreation opportunities).
14 See text accompanying note 80 infra.
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B. Ancient Recognition of Public Rights
1. The Concept of Public Use
The roots of contemporary public water rights are found in many of
the primary antecedents of American jurisprudence. The belief that
water resources are a public asset, subject to a unique pattern of use and
management runs in an almost unbroken line from Roman times to the
present. One scholar.P for example, notes that the res publicae classifi-
cation in Roman law included such state-owned resources as navigable
rivers. A separate Roman classification, res cmmnune-s, described things
common to all, such as the air, running water, and the sea.!" This notion
of public uses was incorporated into early English law. Professor Lauer
contended that the doctrine may have been recognized as early as the
twelfth century'? but that it was clearly established in The Fleta18 and
the writings of the English jurist, Bracton, in the thirteenth century.'?
By the seventeenth century, the controlling principles in England ap-
proached the position that "no man has a property interest in the flow-
ing waters themselves, but simply a usufructuary interest in them as
they pass over his land."20
Public water rights under early English law were not absolute."
Several English jurists appeared to recognize a class of waters not sub-
ject to ordinary public claims of right.22 Nevertheless, the expression
of any public rights was significant in an era of English property law
whose outstanding characteristic was clarification of the individual's
exclusive right to possess.P Accordingly, the articulation of public
15 A. WATSON, THE LAW OF THEANCIENT ROMANS (1970).
16 Id, at 49-50.
17 Lauer, The Common Law Background of the Riparian Doctrine, 28 Mo. L.
REV. 60 (1963).
18 Id. at 70.
19 Id. at 66-69.
20 Id. at 77-78 (commenting on the passage: "And therefore I am of opinion,
that taking this word Aqua for the bare running water, there can be no property
therein, but as the same is incident to the soil, taking them two for one, it is drawn
with the property thereof." The passage is from CALLIS, READING UPON THE
STATUTE OF SEWERS 56 (1647».
21 See id. at 66 (citing H. BRACTON, DE LEGIBNS ET CONSUETUDINIBUS ANGLIAE,
Bk. I, Ch. 12, §§ 5-6) ; id. at 78-79 (citing CALLIS, READING UPON THE STATUTE OF
SEWERS 78 (1647».
22Id.
23 The outstanding characteristic of English property law after the Norman
Conquest was: "[A] tendency to agglomerate in a single person, preferably the one
currently possessed of the thing that is the object of inquiry, the exclusive right
to possess, privilege to use and power to convey the thing." Donahue, Introduc-
tion: The Future of the Concept of Property Predicted from Its Past 7 (unpub-
lished manuscript scheduled for publication in a forthcoming volume of NOMOS).
Similarly, the recognition of public rights belies Coke's famous statement: "cujus
est solum ejus est usque ad coelum." E. COKE, FIRST INSTITUTE 4a, at 198 (Thomas
ed. 1818).
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water rights in all but a narrow set of cases24attests to the durable na-
ture of society's interest in water resources.
2. The Doctrine of Inalienable Royal Stewardship
The central role of government in controlling use of water resources
has developed from a second, distinct doctrine. In the later Middle Ages,
the King began to be viewed less as an absolute ruler and more as a
temporary official in a position of trust.25 Natural resources, including
waters, were included among the property under the King's steward-
ship.26In his management of these resources, the King might grant the
right of exclusive use to an individual but not to the extent of complete
alienation of the public property.P? Accordingly, an individual grantee
took his rights of exclusive use subject to the King's prerogative to
revoke or grant a superseding liberty to another.P The lack of power
to completely alienate water resources, consistent with the nature of the
King's temporary trusteeship, limited the grantee's interest.
24 See Lauer, supra note 17, at 67, noting Bracton's failure to pursue the dis-
tinction between public and private waters.
25 P. RIESENBERG, INALIENABILITY OF SOVEREIGNTY IN MEDIEVAL POLITICAL
THOUGHT 3 (1956).
26See 2 H. BRACTON, ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 167 (S.
Thorne trans. 1%9). Bracton writes of the King:
[T]hings are his which by the jus naturale ought to be the property of
the finder, as treasure trove, wreck, great fish, sturgeon, waif, things
said to belong to no one. Also ... [things] which by natural law
ought to be common to all, as wild beasts and undomesticated birds
which by natural law ought to be acquired by apprehension and capture
of fowling ....
[d.
27 [d. at 168. Bracton defined a liberty as follows: A liberty is "the setting
aside of a servitude, the two being contraries and therefore repugnant to each
other, as where one is bound by virtue of a servitude to give something, as toll and
customs, by virtue of a liberty he may be saved from giving them." [d.
28 [d. at 168-69. The King's freedom in this regard remained intact, despite the
apparent restriction that:
When the lord king grants liberties, as was said above, what he has
once given he cannot resume de jure, nor give to others, especially a
thing of which he is not in seisin, [nor] grant them to the prejudice
[of the liberties] of others, as where he has first granted to one the
liberty of having warren throughout all of his land and fee and then
grants the same to another within the same liberty.
[d. It is quite clear that the first donee could not seek to restrain the latter donee
from use of the resources because such resistance would have been viewed as
questioning the King's authority, a serious deriliction of service to the King. In
making this point Bracton cites an example whereby the abbot of St. Albans,
though first donee, lost his rights by obstructing the use of Galfrid of Childwicke,
the second donee. [d. at 169. Bracton thus Cautions that the subsequent grant of a
new liberty "does [the first donee] an injuria and curtails the liberty first granted,
which he has perhaps used for a long time." [d.
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The doctrine of inalienable royal stewardship, not unlike the modern
public trust doctrine." eroded the ability of private owners to wholly
control public water resources. Government necessarily retained suffi-
cient power to provide for all aspects of the general welfare.P
3. The Doctrine of Natural, Harmless Water Rights
A broad concept of public water rights finds additional support in the
17th Century work of Grotius." For Grotius, rivers were a resource in
which public and private rights co-existed and complemented one an-
other.32 Grotius reasoned that a riparian owner might use his water
rights for private profit, for example, by running a pier into the river.33
The flowing water of the river, however, would remain common for
drawing or drinking.vs In this sense, water was public property. The
determinant of legitimate public use, for Grotius, was that public rights
not overly "disadvantage" private rights.35
Grotius' view supports public water rights in two distinct ways. First,
the nature of water resources, for Grotius, suited them to national
ownership. Second, private ownership of water was subject to the pub-
lic's residual right to make important use of water that did not unduly
affect the private "owner's" rights. Recreational use, of course, was not
in issue for Grotius. Grotius' schema, however, supports the compati-
bility of public recreational uses with continued private rights of owner-
ship and enjoyrnent.t"
The examination of ancient authority fails to reconcile absolutely the
conflict between public and private control of recreationally valuable
waters. Instead, it demonstrates that several of the primary antecedents
of the modern property system accord substantial recognition to the
community's claims for use of water resources. Important at this stage
29 See text accompanying notes 5&--60 infra.
30 As earlier notes suggest, this aspect of inalienability of sovereignty is prob-
ably traceable to canonist views of the Middle Ages. See notes 25-28 supra and
accompanying text. C]. B. TIERNEY, MEDIEVAL POOR LAW (1959) (natural re-
sources viewed as God-given and therefore to be managed by the Church or Crown
for benefit of all).
31 H. GROTIUS, DE JUREBELLI ET PACIS, (S. Whewell trans. 1853). Of roughly
equal reknown is the 17th Century work of Pufendorf, Of the Laws of Nature
G1~d of Nations. Analysis of that treatise reveals similar conclusions to those
derived in this article from Grotius' work. See S. PUFENDORF, OF THE LAws OF
NATURE AND OF NATIONS Bk. IV, Ch. IV, 318-22 (B. Kennet trans. 1703).




36 Subsequent discussion will show that there wiII likely be few justifiable
"owner" claims of incompatibility. See text accompanying notes 100-08 infra.
Further, losses to the "owner" in most cases of incompatibility can be mitigated by
appropriate governmental practices. See text accompanying notes 134-35 infrlJ.
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is the recognized commonality of these resources. Important to Part II
of this Article are the concepts that (1) resource control can be useful
in managing the resource for the good of all and (2) private investment
and improvements in water resources should be free from unduly
damaging public uses.
C. Existing Doctrines of Public Rights
1. The Federal Component: Paramount Rights of Navigation
The American pattern of public and private water rights, which ini-
tially borrowed English precepts, has an interesting and complex his-
tory. On the federal level, American water law traditionally recognizes
public rights only on commercially navigable waters." The roots of this
tradition can be traced to English law and its emphasis on commercial
navigability.s" English law, in tum, has been described as a response to
the commercial needs of awakening industry located on an island nation
laced by a network of harbors and tidal rivers.s" The most obvious need
of the English was unimpeded shipping. As island shipping rarely ex-
tended beyond the tidal reaches of bays and rivers, English law de-
scribed navigable rivers in terms of the ebb and flow of the tide. For all
practical purposes, the legal test divided the waters of England into
those suited to commercial transport and those unsuited.s? Public rights
of free passage applied to all navigable waters.
On the American continent, the initial adoption of the English navi-
gability test was due partly to the general influence of English law and
partly to the practical similarities of channeling goods inland along the
abundant river systems of the Atlantic coast.v' Common sense recogni-
tion of America's continental expanse, however, dictated that the federal
navigation power should extend beyond tidal waters. Despite a few
37 See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
38 See Stone, supra note 10. See also Kaiser Aetna v, United States, 100 S. Ct.
383, 395-96 (1979) (dissenting opinion).
39 Stone, supra note 10, § 35.2, at 180--8l.
40 See, e.q., discussion of this point in Justice Field's opinion in Illinois Cent.
RR v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387,435 (1892) :
At one time the existence of tide waters was deemed essential in
determining the admiralty jurisdiction of courts in England. That doc-
trine is now repudiated in this country as wholly inapplicable to our
condition. In England the ebb and flow of the tide constitute the legal
test of the navigability of waters. There no waters are navigable in
fact, at least to any great extent, which are not subject to the tide.
Accord, The Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How). 443, 454-55 (1851).
41 See Bartke, Navigability in Michigan in Retrospect and Prospect, 16 WAYNE
L. REV. 409, 410 n.13 (1970) and sources cited therein; cj, Horwitz, The Trans-
formation in the Conception of Property in American Law, 1780-1860,40 U. CHI.
L. REv. 248 (1973) (explaining the ascendancy of economic motivations as a
determinant of property relations).
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early decisions which restricted federal admiralty jurisdiction to coastal
waters.P the United States Supreme Court soon extended the admiralty
power, with equal force, to any public waters used for commercial pur-
poses or foreign trade.t" Public waters, in turn, were defined by Justice
Field as those waters, in their ordinary condition, which were used, or
were capable of being used, as "highways for commerce.t'v' Justice
Field's formulation extended public rights to those rivers which were
"navigable-in-fact."
The significance of the federal navigability test extended bey-ond is-
sues of trade and commerce, it bore importantly on the division of power
between federal and state government and between public and private
water rights. The navigation servitudes" played an integral part in
fashioning the dominant role of the federal government in matters of
interstate and international commerce.t" Perhaps because of its juris-
dictional overtones, the navigation servitude and the public rights it
represents have been given extraordinary preeminence in two cen-
turies of judicial review. Repeatedly, it has been held that the servitude
does not "take" private rights but rather reflects the "lawful exercise
of a power to which the interests of riparian owners have always been
subject."47
42 See, e.g., The Steamboat Thomas Jefferson, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 465 (1825)
(refusing to exercise admiralty jurisdiction over a seaman's wage claim arising
on the Mississippi and Missouri Rivers).
43 The Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443,457 (1851).
44 The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (19 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870). See also Utah v.
United States, 403 U.S. 9, 10--11 (1971) (affirming the Daniel Ball view of navi-
gability) .
45 See note 8 supra.
46 The servitude is generally traceable to the Constitution's grant of commer-
cial authority. U.S. CaNST. art. I, § 8, d. 3. It is, however, sometimes viewed as
having its origins in a more expansive pre-Constitutional surrender of sovereignty
by the several states. Ci. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, art. IV, 1 Stat. 4 (1778)
(right of free passage between the states). See generally Leighty, The Source and
Scope of Public and Private Rights in Navigable Waters, 5 LAND & WATER L.
REV. 391, 414-18 (1970).
47 United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121, 123 (1967) ..The unstated importance
of the pre-Constitutional surrender of sovereignty is that it acts as a limit upon
the States' creation and recognition of private property rights related to the
waters in question. It obviates any tenth amendment claim of State authority to
inhibit the servitude as well as fifth amendment due process claims of private
owners whose rights are defined by state law. See Michelman, Property Utility
and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "lust Compensation"
Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1240--41 (1967). C]. Coquillette, Mosses From an
Old Manse: Another Look at some Historic Property Cases About the Environ-
ment, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 761, 7~-805 (1979) (noting that some forms of non-
exclusive ownership have been recognized in western property law).
The recent decision in Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 383 (1979),
does not significantly repudiate this view. Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion
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The balance between public and private water rights reflects more
than the mechanical application of static principles. The extent of public
rights has varied with the changing demands American society has
placed on its water resources. It is no more surprising that public rights
in navigable waters have been held to include pleasure boating and
fishing,48 than that the very definition of navigability evolved beyond
the English "ebb and flow" test. Accordingly, commercially navigable
waters, under the "navigability-in-fact" test, carry with them a set of
public usufructuary rights that may be enforced against private owners
who would try to exclude the public from those waters'? or substantially
limit public recreational use of the surface."?
2. The Stale Components: State Ownership and Navigability
State law provides the public with rights to use waters beyond those
guaranteed by the federal navigation servitude. Professor Sax states:
There are any number of ways in which states can, and have,
found a right of common use in lakes, whether the beds are
publically/privately owned, and whether the courts use the
doctrine of riparian rights, state ownership of water, or the
existence of the state law servitude in favor of public use.51
As Professor Sax indicates, these public rights most frequently arise
expressly distinguished cases such as Rands, "Iblecause the factual situation in
this case is so different from typical ones involved in riparian condemnation cases
we see little point in tracing the historical development of that doctrine here." Id,
at 391. The principal distinctions offered to i ustify this view were (1) that navi-
gability in Kaiser Aetna was predicated upon private improvements of the water,
(2) traditional state law recognition of the specific private claim of right, and (3)
the consent of government to the private alteration of the waters involved without
warning that such works would establish public usufructuary claims. ld.
48 See Waite, Pleasure Boating in a Federal Union, 10 BUFFALO L. REV. 427, 431
(1961). See gl'1lerallyJohnson, Ripariaw and Public Rights to Lakes and Streams,
35 WASH. L. REV. 580 (1960).
49 But see Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 383 (1979) (holding that
navigability under the federal test need not always result in public usufructuary
rights, finding such rights are instead a function of the purposes for which the
water is found navigable).
50Here again, there are some minor exceptions. Treaty obligations of the
government may be grounds on which to limit public fishing. See, e.g., United
States v. State of Michigan, 471 F. Supp. 192 (W.D. Mich. 1979) ; United States
v. Pollmann, 364 F. Supp. 995 (D. Mont. 1973). The states are also authorized to
grant exclusive rights to cultivate oyster-beds and other types of aquaculture
which may be viewed as limiting the public's right to full use of the resource. See
Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842).
51J. SAX, WATER LAW PLANNING AND POLICY 298 (1967). See gellerally
Leighty, Public Rights ill Navigable State Waters-Some Statutory Approaches,
6 LAND & WATER L. REV. 459 (1971). But cf. Stone, supra note 10, § 37.3, at 210
(suggesting instances exist in which private landowners can rely on traditional
real property doctrines to exclude all public use of the affected waters) .
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under three rubrics. First, the state may grant public rights by exercis-
ing its prerogatives as owner of submerged lands. Second, the state may
define navigability more broadly than the federal test. Third, the state
may grant public rights as a function of its outright ownership of the
water itself.52 Inquiry into the justifications of these three doctrines,
however, reveals that they more coherently fit within the central tenet
of this Article that the nature of water as a societal resource is the well-
head of public rights.
(a] State Ownership of Bottomlands
In Martin v. Waddell, 53 the Supreme Court first accepted the rule,
expanded by subsequent cases." that the states owned the bed and
underlying commercially navigable waters within their respective boun-
daries." Since Martin, almost all states have retained their ownership
of these lands.56 In fact, it is unlikely that a state can alienate any sig-
nificant fraction of these lands if such a grant would substantially di-
minish the value of the water resources to the public.F State ownership
of these subaqueous lands is viewed as ownership in trust for the
people.58 Accordingly, the overlying waters are usually open to satisfy
the needs of the general public."
This doctrine, which casts government as a trustee, reflects an ancient
tradition which was in part alluded to by Chief Justice Taney in Martin
v. Waddell/" In particular, Taney described the trust responsibility in
52 Several western states claim ownership of the waters found therein in ac-
cordance with the "Colorado Doctrine." See Stone, supra note 10, § 39.2(B), at
239. These states are Arizona, Colorado, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah,
and Wyoming. Id. § 39.2, at 236 n.70.
53 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842).
54 Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324 (1876) (extending Martin to inland fresh
water not affected by tidal flows) ; Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.)
212 (1845) (extending Martin to tidelands adjoining a State not among the
original Colonies).
55 There are some minor exceptions which result from pre-statehood grants by
either the Crown or the federal government, or a colonial recognition of some
limited private rights to tidelands. See CLARK TREATISE, supra note 5, § 37.2(c),
at 207-08 nn.26---28.
56 Id. at 208 and § 41.2, at 256---58 nn.73-74.
57 See Illinois Cent. RR. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452-61 (1892); 1 R.
POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 'If 160, at 641, 651-52 (rev. ed. 1977). See
also text accompanying notes 25-27 supra.
58 See generally Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law.'
Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 473, 478-91 (1970).
59 There are some exceptions made when a state grants private rights to exploit
the natural resources underlying the waterbody. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. §
93.354 (West 1969) (Iakebed mining).
60 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842). In Martin, the Court was called upon to choose
between competing private claims of exclusive use of navigable waters for oyster
cultivation. The discussion relevant here arose in the course of rejecting a private
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terms of protecting the public right of fishing, "a liberty of fishing in the
sea, or creeks or arms thereof, as a public common of piscary...."61
The royal mantle of preserving this trust was transferred to the people
and thence to the states:
For when the revolution took place, the people of each state
became themselves sovereign; and in that character hold the
absolute right to all their navigable waters, and soils under
them, for their own common use, subject only to the rights
since surrendered by the constitution to the general govern-
ment. 62
Taney's extension of the trusteeship responsibilities beyond naviga-
tion indicates recognition of a broad conception of public rights. The
Anglo-American concept of commercial navigability, while perhaps a
convenient vehicle to establish state ownership of subaqueous lands, fails
to account for the recognition of broader public rights such as fishing.
Thus, although public water rights created by M artin were ostensibly
a function of state title to bottomland/" these rights derive more logi-
cally from the qualitative nature of the resource and thereby are subject
to public demands for broader uses.
(b) State Law Definitions of Navigability
States are free to open additional waters to public use by adopting
claim predicated upon ownership of the underlying beds. The claimant relied on
a pre-revolutionary patent from Charles II of England to the Duke of York and
subsequent conveyances which were literally adequate to convey to him the sub-
merged mud flats. Ghief Justice Taney reasoned that the grant to the Duke of
York was intended to provide the foundation for re-creating English legal pat-
terns in the new world: "Whatever was held by the King as a prerogative right,
passed to the duke in the same character." 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 413. Thus:
[T'[he land under the navigable water passed to the grantee, as one
of the royalties incident to the powers of government; and were to be
held by him, in the same manner, and for the same purposes that the
navigable waters of England, and the soils under them, are held by the
crown.
Id. at 413--14. See also Reed, Use It and Lose It-Sur/ace Water Rights in Idaho,
15 IDAHO L. REV. 569, 573--75 (1979).
61 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 412 (quoting from M. HALE, DE JURE MARIS, ET BRACHI-
ORUM EJUSDEM (Hargrave's Law Tracts 1787) ).
62 Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367,410 (1842).
63 The states may own bottomlands by virtue of patent or purchase as well as
under the doctrine of Martin. Ct. CLARK TREATISE, supra note 5, § 37.2(c), at
209-10 (acknowledging similar public rights but cautioning against viewing them
as a function of bed ownership). It is also somewhat ironic to note that in Martin
the Court upheld the exclusive private use of the same navigable waters by the
rival claimant whose title derived from a grant from the State of New Jersey.
41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 367. This apparent anomaly can be reconciled by comparing
the scope of the competing grants and applying the principles the Supreme Court
later articulated in Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
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broader definitions of navigability. In fact, several states did so, early in
their history, primarily to accommodate the local developmental needs
of frontier society. Typical of these states is Wisconsin which adopted a
"saw-log" test of navigability: if the water could float a log to the mill
at high water, .then it was navigable." Other courts, however, disre-
garded the niceties of navigability and forthrightly recognized the more
secure footing of public rights: the unique character of the water re-
source and its value to society.
In 1974,in Kelly ex rel M acM.ullen v. Hallden,65 the Michigan Court
of Appeals held that the public enjoyed recreational boating and fishing
rights on the St. Joseph River, regardless of the river's "navigability"
under Michigan's log-floating standard.P'' The log-floating standard
had been adopted one hundred years earlier by the Michigan Supreme
Court in Moore v. SanborneF' Interestingly, the Moore court had not
designed its log-floating test as the sine qua non of navigability. Instead,
the court fixed on the standard as a changeable but convenient one in a
region whose principal businesses included lumbering.V Significantly,
the court held:
The servitude of the public interest depends rather upon the
purpose for which the public requires the use of its streams,
than upon any particular mode of use .... The public claim to
a right of passage along its streams must depend upon their
capacity for the use to which they can be made subservient.s"
Noting that in the intervening century Moore's: rationale had been
viewed as a pragmatic one, correlating public water rights with public
necessity for their use, the MacMullen v. H alldencourt held thatrecre-
. - - -. . ,
64 See, e.g., Nekoosa Edwards Paper Co. v. Railroad Comrn'n, 201 Wis. 40, +,
228 N.W. 144, 146 (1929), aff'd, per curiam, 283 U.S. 787 (1931) ; Olson v. Merrill,
42 Wis. 203, 212 (1877). .
65 51 Mich. App. 176, 214 N.W.2d 856 (1974). The result and reasoning in this
case favor public rights. There are decisions on roughly similar facts rejecting
such rights, sometimes within the same jurisdiction. Compare id., with Pigorsh
v. Fahner, 22 Mich. App. 108, 177 N.W.2d.466 (1970)., qff'd, 386 Mich. 508, 194
N.W.2d 343 (1972).' '. ...
6651 Mich. App. 176,214N.W.2d856 (1974).
67 2 Mich. 520 (1853). In M oore the Michigan Supreme Court had adopted the
following test: . .
The true test, therefore, to be applied in such cases is, whether a
stream is inherently and in its nature, capable of being used for the
purposes of commerce for the floating of vessels, boats, rafts, or logs.
Where a stream possesses such a character, then the easement exists,
leaving to the owners of the bed all other modes of use, not inconsistent
with it. .
Id. at 524-25.
68 See Bartke, supra note 41, at 412-18.
69 51 Mich. App. at 181--82,214 N.W.2d at 858-59 (quoting 2 Mich. at 525-36).
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ational use alone would serve to define a stream as navigable."?
However states determined navigability, state-created public rights
came to include recreational navigation as well.71 The public's recre-
ational rights, however, generally extended only to the waters them-
selves. Private owners of riparian or littoral lands were often' successful
in limiting associated land-based recreational uses such as picnicking or
camping'< and could even rely on trespass actions to prohibit overland
access to the waters." Nonetheless, the candor of decisions like Moore
and H allden. illuminate an importantprecept: public water rights are
best described asa function of the myriad human uses to which the
water resource is suited. These decisions implicitly recognize that the
state, by choosing a particular navigability test, allocates water use
opportunities. Like Chief Justice Taney in Martin v. Waddell, these
decisions recognize a governmental role insuring that water resources
provide broad societal benefits.Is
(c) State Ownership,qf Water
At least three western states claim ownership of all surface waters
70 In reaching its conclusion, the court of appeals claimed the company' of nine
other states, California, Maryland, Minnesota, New York, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oregon, South Dakota, and Wisconsin. 51 Mich. App, at 188 n.11, 214 N.W.2d at
862 n.ll. Being picayune, one might note that the Minnesota precedent, Lamprey
v. State, 52 Mimi. 181,53 N.W. 1139 (1893), had been overruled in relevant part
by State v. Bollenbach, 241 Minn. 103,63 N.W.2d 278 (1954). But see Johnson v.
Seifert, 257 Minn. 159, 100 N.W.2d 689 (1960) (divorcing public usufructs from
navigability) .
71 See, e.g., Diana Shooting Club v. Husting, 156 Wis. 261, 271, 145 N.W. 8J6,
820 (1914) (hunting and fishing are incidents of the right of navigation). See also
Johnson & Austin, supra note 7, at 45-47. .
72 See, e.q., Snively v. Jaber, 48 Wash. 2d.815,824,296 P.2d 1015, 1020 (1956)
(injunction to prevent trespass to littoral fast lands by users of lake surface). C].
Botton v. State, 69 Wash. 2d 751, 757, .420 P.2d 352, 356 (1966) (state duty to
prevent licensees from trespassing for picnicking and other uses of littoral fast
lands) discussed in text accompanying notes 214-18 infra; Monroe Mill Co. v.
Menzel, 35 Wash. 487, 77 P. 813,816 (1904) (denying right to trespass on banks
to break jams ofshingle bolts). But cj. Elder v. Delcour, 365 Mo. 835, 269 S.W.2d
17 (1954) (allowing portageover fast lands).'
73 See generally 1 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY'\[ 160, at 641-42
(rev. ed. 1977); see also, Johnson & Austin, supra note 7,.at 34 n.142.
74 There is an admittedly unsatisfying aspect to this type of inductive argument
which attempts' to prove that water is a special, uniquely public resource by pre-
senting many examples of' its being accorded such tr~tment.The examples,
standing alone, fail to negate the possibility that their consistency is more than
mere coincidence, or worse, error compounded by repetition of an incorrect early
precedent or conception: To meet these doubts, effort will be made to scrutinize
the rationale as well as the fact of special treatment in each of several contexts.
See, e.q., text accompanying notes 60-63 Sltpra;. text. accompanying notes 76-82
infra. Cj. K. WITTFOGEL, ORIENTAL DESPOTISM (1957) (emphasizing the.societal
importance of water by demonstrating its role as determinant of crucial facets of
political and social order).
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within their boundaries." Although public rights in these states are
often described in terms of the state's ownership of water.l" the under-
lying justification for these rights again seems to rest on a more funda-
mental basis. For example, in Southern Idaho Fish & Game Associo-
ation v. Picabo Livestock, Inc.,77 the Idaho Supreme Court upheld pub-
lic recreational rights on waters flowing through defendant's land. Al-
though the court oould have based its decision on narrow statutory
grounds," it relied on the Idaho Constitution and the state's ownership
of water to broadly hold that, "[T]he basic question of navigability is
simply the suitability of a particular water for public use."79
Essentially, Idaho's claims of water ownership reflect the importance
of public control over the resource. Especially in the arid west, the rela-
75 They are New Mexico, Wyoming, and Idaho. See Southern Idaho Fish &
Game Ass'n v. Picabo Livestock Inc., 96 Idaho 360, 528 P.2d 1295 (1974) ; State
v. Red River Valley Co., 51 N.M.207, 182 P.2d 421 (1945); Day v. Armstrong,
362 P.2d 137 (Wyo. 1961).
76 Ci. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 99 S. Ct. 1727, 1731-36 (1979) (eliminating fic-
titious reliance on "ownership" as state's basis for regulation of natural resource,
overruling Geer v, Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896».
7796 Idaho 360, 528 P.2d 1295 (1974).
78 See Idaho Code §§ 36-901, -907 (repealed 1976). The latter section declares
as navigable those waters which at high water stage will float a six-inch-diameter
log. The former sections declare public rights of fishery on navigable waters which
(at some point) flow through public lands. In Picabo Livestock, there was evi-
dence demonstrating the successful flotation of 6-Y>-inch diameter logs. Although
there was no express finding that Silver Creek flowed through public land at some
point, such was apparently the case. As a result, a statutory right of public fishery
could be claimed. Reliance on the broader ground suggested in the text estab-
lished recreational rights in excess of those conferred by Idaho Code § 36-901.
The statutes provide:
36-901. Public waters highways for fishing.-Navigable rivers, sloughs
or streams within the meander lines or not meandered between
the lines of ordinary high water thereof, of the state of Idaho, and all
rivers, sloughs and streams flowing through any public lands of the
state shall hereafter be public highways for the purpose of angling or
fishing thereon and any right or title to such streams or lands between
the high water flow lines or within the meander lines of navigable
streams shall be subject to the right of any person owning a fish license
of this state, who desires to fish therein or along the banks, to go upon
the same for such purpose.
36-907. Navigable streams for fishing.-For the purpose of this act,
the following streams or parts of streams are declared navigable
streams: ... and every other stream or part of a stream on which logs
or timber can be floated to market or the place of use during the high
water season of the year. For the purpose of this act, logs and timber
are defined as any cut timber having a diameter in excess of six (6)
inches; high water is defined as the time of year when the stream
normally carries its greatest volume.
79 96Idaho at., 528 P.2d at 1297-98.
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tive scarcity of water has been frequently used to justify extensive state
regulation of the resource.s? Historically, western states have exercised
this authority to encourage private appropriative uses for mining and
agriculture.s! In Picabo Livestock, the court affirmed the power of the
state to promote public water rights as wel1.82 Moreover, the court's
suitability-for-use test shifted attention from the traditional doctrines
of state ownership and navigability and underscored the public's entitle-
ment to enjoy the resource free of all private restraints except those
recognized by government as being for the good of the state. Picabo
Livestock supports the premise that public rights are a function of the
unique characteristics of water; traditional standards of ownership and
navigability are but vehicles by which public uses are established.
D. Constitutional ((Takings" and Contemporary Legal Theory
As public use of "private" waters increases, private riparian or lit-
toral landowners may claim a taking of their right to exclude others
from the water, requiring just compensation.s" In most of these situ-
ations, however, private landowners do not enjoy sufficiently exclusive
use of the water upon which a claim for compensation can be grounded.
Currently, few landowners are in a position to wholly exclude others
from recreational waters because riparian and littoral doctrines of com-
mon use vitiate exclusivity unless one owner owns all land surrounding
the waterbody.f" If anyone else owns riparian land, their personal use
80 See generally 1 W. HUTCHINS, WATER RIGHTS LAWS IN THE NINETEEN
WESTERN STATES 3--5 (1977) ; Stone, supra note 10, § 39.3, at 241-45.
81 See, e.q., Clark v, Nash, 198 U.S. 361 (1905), where the Court noted:
The rights of a riparian owner in and to the use of the water flowing
by his land are not the same in the arid and mountainous States of the
West that they are in the States of the East. These rights have been
altered by many of the Western States ... for the very purpose of
thereby contributing to the growth and prosperity of those States aris-
ing from mining and the cultivation of an otherwise valueless soil, by
means of irrigation. This court must recognize the difference in climate
and soil, which render necessary these different laws in the States so
situated.
u. at 370.
82 But ct. C. MEYERS & A. TARLOCK, \VATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 805-06
(1971) (criticizing as mere ipse dixit a similar judicial recognition of public
rights to use water previously regarded as private).
83 See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 383 (1979) (waterbody con-
sidered to be private under local law). But ct. Prune Yard Shopping Center v.
Robins, 100 S. Ct. 2035 (1980) (right to exclude subject to limitation under state
constitution) .
84 A degree of relative exclusivity is also possible if a small number of indi-
viduals own all the riparian or littoral lands and mutually agree to severely limit
use. The mutual covenant may create an enforceable use limitation similar to sole
ownership.
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and power to license others to use the waterbody strips exclusivity of
its common meaning.f" Moreover, as developed above,86 many states
already recognize public usufructuary rights on waters whose beds and
shores are privately owned. Nevertheless, occasional destruction of
exclusive use remains a possible consequence, a "hard case," in which to
explore the takings issue.
Four recent United States Supreme Court decisions are particu-
larly instructive in addressing the public taking of the private right to
exclude. In Kaiser Aetna v. United States,87 the Court found that exclu-
sive recreational water rights may sometimes be a property right whose
deprivation requires compensation.f" In three other decisions, Andrus
v. Allard,89Prune Yard Shopping Center v. Robins,90and Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. City of New York,91 however, acknowledgments
of public rights were held not to constitute takings, despite their adverse
impacts on private property owners. The interplay between Kaiser
Aetna and these three cases offers guidelines for responsible employ-
ment of governmental power, while confirming the wide latitude given
state governments in the management and allocation of their natural
resources.
1. Kaiser Aetna v. United States
At issue in Kaiser Aetna was the development of a private Hawaiian
lagoon, Kuapa Pond, into a residential-marina subdivision connected to
the Pacific Ocean by a privately constructed channel.P" The developer,
Kaiser Aetna, received a permit to construct the channel from the
United States Army Corps of Engineers which, after the channel's
completion, informed Kaiser Aetna for the first time that the lagoon
was thereby rendered navigable and available for public use.93 Kaiser
Aetna sued the United States, claiming that the Corps' insistence on
public access deprived the development's investors of their rights of
exclusive use, requiring just compensation.P" The United States re-
sponded that the lagoon's navigability-in-fact subjected it to public use
under the "no compensation" rule of the federal navigation servitude.t"
85 C]. Bartke, The Navigation Servitude and lust Compensationr-Struggle
for a Doctrine, 48 OR. L. REV. 1, 17-19 (1968) (government need not compensate
for shared benefits such as non-exclusive flowage easements).
86 See generally text accompanying notes 51-82 supra.
87 100 S. Ct. 383 (1979). See also Vaughn v. Vermillion Corp., 100 S. Ct. 399
(1979) (companion case to Kaiser Aetna).
88 100 S. Ct. at 393.
89 100 S. Ct. 318 (1979).
90 100 S. Ct. 2035 (1980).
91 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
92 100 S. Ct. at 385.
93 Id, at 387-88.
94/d.
95/d.
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The Supreme' Court agreed with the Corps that Kuapa Pond had
been transformed into navigable water for the purposes of government
regulation under the Commerce Clause and the navigation servitude/"
Justice Rehnquist, however, writing for the majority, maintained that
"[t jhis Court has never held that the navigation servitude creates a
blanket exception to the Takings Clause ...."97 The Court found that
private rights had been taken, emphasizing (1) the private initiative
and expenditure in creating the channel, (2) the longstanding state rec-
ognition of the Pond as private property, and (3) the Corps' permission
to dredge without mention of future public use.98 Accordingly, the
Court held that public use of Kuapa Pond required the payment of just
cornpensation.P"
2. Putting Kaiser Aetna Into Perspective: the Allard and Prune Yard
Decisions
Impairment of an individual's right to exclude others from private
waters does not automatically indicate a taking. In even those cases
where all adjacent land is owned by a single riparian, public use does
not constitute a physical appropriation of the water-P? nor infringe upon
any incidents of ownership associated with the fast lands themselves.
The property owner retains the great bulk of rights associated with
ownership of the property, he need only share with the public a single
strand of his bundle of property rights, reasonable recreational use of
the water.t'" In Andrus v. Allard, the Court held:" [T]he denial of one
traditional property right does not always amount to a taking. At least
where the owner possesses a full 'bundle' of property rights, the de-
struction of one 'strand' of the bundle is not a taking because the ag-
gregate must be viewed in its entirety."102
At issue in Allard was disposition of eagle feathers (and other parts
of birds) acquired lawfully by a dealer in Indian artifacts but subse-
96 Id. at 388.
97 Id. at 389.
98 ld. at 386-93.
99 Id. at 393.
100 Physical appropriation of a fee interest by the government or its agents is,
most commonly, a successful basis for a taking claim. See, e.g., United States v.
Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) ; United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1943).
101 There is, however, an undeniable sense in which loss of potential solitude
that accompanies exclusivity of use is a real loss. Additionally, the owner may
suffer financial loss where private waters are licensed for use for a fee and free
access subsequently becomes available. It is contended that these "losses," although
real, do not amount to a taking.
102 100 S. Ct. 318, 327 (1979). The appellee in this case retained all rights to
possess, transport, or exhibit his property; only his right to sell the property was
denied. See text accompanying notes 104--07 infra.
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quently protected by Congressional Iegislation.P" The legislation per-
mitted Allard to possess, transport, or exhibit the artifacts but pro-
hibited their sale, even though they had been lawfully obtained prior to
the statute's enactment.V'" The Court admitted that the most profitable
103 The Eagle Protection Act provides:
Whenever, after investigation, the Secretary of the Interior shall
determine that it is compatible with the preservation of the bald eagle
or the golden eagle to permit the taking, possession, and transportation
of specimens thereof for the scientific or exhibition purposes of public
museums, scientific societies, and zoological parks, or for the religious
purposes of Indian tribes, or that it is necessary to permit the taking
of such eagles for the protection of wildlife or of agricultural or other
interests in any particular locality, he may authorize the taking of such
eagles pursuant to regulations which he is hereby authorized to pre-
scribe: Provided, That on request of the Governor of any State, the
Secretary of the Interior shall authorize the taking of golden eagles
for the purpose of seasonally protecting domesticated flocks and herds
in such State, in accordance with regulations established under the
provisions of this section, in such part or parts of such State and for
such periods as the Secretary determines to be necessary to protect such
interests: Provided further, That bald eagles may not be taken for any
purpose unless, prior to such taking, a permit to do so is procured from
the Secretary of the Interior: Provided further, That the Secretary of
the Interior, pursuant to such regulations as he may prescribe, may
permit the taking, possession, and transportation of golden eagles for
the purposes of falconry: except that only golden eagles which would
be taken because of depredations on livestock or wildlife may be taken
for purposes of falconry. Provided further, That the Secretary of the
Interior, pursuant to such regulations as he may prescribe, may permit
the taking of golden eagle nests which interfere with resource develop-
ment or recovery operations.
Eagle Protection Act, 16 U.S.c. § 668(a) (Supp. II 1978).
The Migratory Bird Treaty Act provides:
Unless and except as permitted by regulations made as hereinafter
provided in this subchapter, it shall be unlawful at any time, by any
means or in any manner, to pursue, hunt, take, capture, kill, attempt to
take, capture, or kill, possess, offer for sale, sell, offer to barter, barter,
offer to purchase, purchase, deliver for shipment, ship, export, import,
cause to be shipped, exported, or imported, deliver for transportation,
transport or cause to be transported, carry or cause to be carried, or
receive for shipment, transportation, carriage, or export, any migra-
tory bird, any part, nest, or egg of any such bird, or any product,
whether or not manufactured, which consists, or is composed in whole
or part, of any such bird or any part, nest, or eggs thereof, included in
the terms of the conventions between the United States and Great
Britain ... for the protection of migratory birds and game mammals
concluded February 7, 1936, and the United States and the Government
of Japan for the protection of migratory birds and birds in danger of
extinction, and their environment concluded March 4, 1972.
Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. § 703 (1976).
104 50 C.F.R. §§ 21.2(a), 22.2(a) (1974).
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use of the property was precluded because Allard had clearly bought the
items for resale.P" Nevertheless, no taking was found because at least
some economic benefit from the artifacts might be salvaged.P'' For
example, the Court suggested that the artifacts might be successfully
displayed for an admission charge.P?
In comparison to the A llard case, any diminution of private property
values that might accompany increased public water rights, would be
slight. Even when the private owner's use was' truly exclusive, public
use will seldom limit reasonable use of the parcel as severely as the
regulation in Allard. The private owner would retain both personal use
of the water and the right to license the use of others. The value of such
rights is evidenced by the high prices currently paid for riparian tracts
on public waters and by the economic success of private marina and
boat launching facilities which thrive on such waters in spite of pub-
lically provided recreational access and use. Allard, in contrast, left
property owners with only the hope that the public would pay to view
eagle feathers in a private museum. lOS
The Kaiser Aetna formulation of private recreational water rights
was recently distinguished in Prune Yard Shopping Center v. Robins. 109
In Prune Yard, the Court denied the owners of a private shopping
center the right to exclude members of the public who sought to exer-
cise their rights of free speech, guaranteed them by the California Con-
stitution.P" Justice Rehnquist, again writing for the majority, held that
in this case the exercise of public rights on private property did not
constitute a taking.P! Kaiser Aetna was distinguished in two ways.
First, the expensive development of the Kaiser Aetna marina complex,
including the dredging of the artificial canal, was interpreted as generat-
ing "reasonable investment backed expectations"112 of exclusive use
which were fatally absent from the Prune Yard development.11 3 Second,
105 100 S. Ct. at 327.
106Id.
107Id. One suspects that museum exhibition is not feasible due to either lack
of public interest or competition from existing public museums. If such use were
lucrative the logic of the sales ban would require prohibition of museum use as
well. Foremost among the justifications for a ban on sales of lawfully taken birds
is that enforcement would be impossible if the ban were limited to parts of illegally
taken birds. The parts of legally taken birds and those of illegally taken birds are
indistinguishable. Id. at 323. The same enforcement dilemma would arise if prefit-
able museum use provided sufficient incentive for continued destruction of pro-
tected birds.
lOS Id. at 327.
109 100 S. Ct. 2035 (1980).
110 Id. at 2042-43.
111 Id. at 2042.
112Id.
113 Although the owner of the Prune Yard development claimed to have
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Prune Yard stressed that the California legislature was uniquely quali-
fied to balance the competing values of California property rights with
the state interest in expansive rights of free speech.P" While the state's
redefinition of property rights could not conflict with the fourteenth
amendment's due process guarantees, Prune Yard apparently reiterates
the burgeoning state authority to weigh competing values in its defini-
tion of property.P''
Prune Yard and Allard help to clarify the scope of Kaiser Aetna.
First, the exclusive recreational water rights recognized in Kaiser
Aetna may have been a unique byproduct of the "investment backed
expectations" raised by Kaiser Aetna's extensive marina developments.
Jn that event, the more typical riparian owner who has failed to make
such extensive changes may have no greater "investment backed ex-
pectations" of exclusive use than did the shopping center owner in
Prune Yard. Moreover, if takings are to be found on the basis of the
diminution of economic value of the property.P" Allard indicates that
"backed" his expectation of the "right to exclude" with the capital needed to build
the shopping center in the first place, the Court held that he had "failed to demon-
strate that the 'right to exclude others' is so essential to the use or economic value
of [his] property that the state-authorized limitation of it amounted to a 'tak-
ing.''' Id. Apparently, the Court felt that the general construction and opera-
tional investments were made primarily with the expectation of generating a
return flow of rental income and not, specifically, for the purpose of building a
facility from which public speech activities could be excluded.
The text does not discuss the constitutional result when the landowner can
successfully demonstrate that all reasonable investment-backed expectations have
been frustrated. Several factors justify this omission. First, private development
expenditures can likely be recouped in spite of recognized public rights. See text
accompanying notes 107-08 supra. Second., an expectation of exclusivity is ar-
guably unreasonable in light of the variability of state laws concerning public
recreational rights and their traditional recognition in Anglo-American jurispru-
dence. See text accompanying notes 15-36 &·51-82 supra. Third, states which im-
plement public rights responsibly might well opt to favor some private entrepre-
neurial operations associated with exclusivity and low density use. See text accom-
panying notes 190 & 191 infra. Fourth, to the extent the value "taken" is attribut-
able to the parcel's proximity to a public resource, no compensation is required.
See United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121, 124 (1967). Finally, any remaining
situations will likely be sufficiently limited that the state can either purchase public
rights or grant these few landowners their private rights without affecting the
regulatory or fiscal integrity of the state's overall plan.
114 100 S. Ct. at 2040-41.
115 ld. at 2041-42. Justice Rehnquist clearly allocates such authority to the
states when he claims, "Nor as a general proposition is the United States, as op-
posed to the several states, possessed of residual authority that enables it to define
'property' in the first instance." ld. at 2042.
116 The diminution of value test was perhaps best articulated by Justice Holmes
in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v, Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). See Michelman, supra
note 47, at 1190-93.
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even the primary economic value of a property right can be significantly
affected without constituting a compensable taking.
Second, Kaiser Aetna may have been decided differently had the
State of Hawaii, either judicially or legislatively, previously extended
public recreational rights to Kuapa Pond based on the Pond's suitability
for recreational use. The importance given in Prune Yard to state de-
terminations regarding property rights parallels the emphasis in Kaiser
Aetna that Kuapa Pond, under Hawaii law, was private. As California
was free to promote public speech in a private shopping center, any state
could similarly promote public recreational rights on any suitable lake
or stream.P" This distinction accords with recent Court decisions rec-
ognizing particularly broad state authority concerning the management
and allocation of the states' natural resources, especially water.ll8
Finally, state adoption of a suitability-for-use test would comport with
the previously discussed ancient recognition of public water rights and
the underlying rationale of changing federal and state definitions of
navigability. Thus, in all but the most attenuated circumstances, recog-
nition of public recreational water rights would "take" nothing from
private landowners.
3. Foreshadowing the Preferred Model of Governmental Action: Penn
Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York
In Kaiser Aetna, the Court found that resolution of the takings issue
depended less upon mechanical formulas than upon ad hoc inquiries of
fairness.P" Nevertheless, much of the opinion criticized the delayed,
somewhat ad hoc manner in which the Corps notified the marina de-
velopers that their efforts had opened Kuapa Pond to public naviga-
tion.P? In fact, Kaiser Aetna was decided in part on an unusual theory
of administrative estoppelP! stemming from the Corps' conspicuous
117 Prune Yard fully puts to rest any broad reading of Kaiser Aetna's ringing
statement, "In this case, we hold that 'the right to exclude,' so universally held to
be a fundamental element of the property right, falls within this category of inter-
ests that the Government cannot take without compensation." 100 S. Ct. at 393.
118 See, e.g., Reeves v. Stake, 48 U.S.L.W. 4746, 4747-48 & n.11 (1980) ; Cali-
fornia v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 653, 678 (1978) ; Baldwin v. Montana Fish
& Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 386 (1977). In California v. United States, Justice
Rehnquist required deference to state water law in the context of federal reclama-
tion legislation: "Since it is clear that the states have the control of water within
their boundaries, it is essential that each and every owner along a given water
course, including the United States, must be amenable to the law of the state ...."
438 U.S. at 678 (quoting with approval from S. Rep. No. 755, 82d Cong., 1st Sess.,
3,6). But ci. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 33&-39 (1978); Philadelphia v.
New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623 (1977) (state control of natural resources within
its borders must be consistent with commerce clause limitations).
119 100 S. Ct. at 390.
120 [d. at 392-93. . .
121 Justice Rehnquist apparently relied on a distinction between estoppel' and
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failure to warn the developers that their proposed canal would carry
public access consequences.P" This failure apparently led to the frui-
tion of expectancies in the landowner which, the court felt, required
condemnation. These expectancies may not have legitimately developed,
however, had the scope of public recreational water rights been clearly
articulated in an established and comprehensive policy. In Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. City of New York,123 the Court found that gov-
ernment regulation was far less likely to constitute a taking when done
pursuant to a general plan.124
In Penn Central, the owners of Grand Central Station were prevented
from converting the structure into a high-rise office buildingP? by New
York City's Landmark Preservation Law.126 The owners argued that
this limitation was both a compensable taking of their property rights127
and an arbitrary exercise of "spot zoning."128 The Court found neither
argument persuasive. Justice Brennan concluded that a taking had not
occurred because the law did not interfere with Penn Central's "pri-
mary expectation" concerning the use of the property.P" The law did
not operate arbitrarily, he continued, because it was based on a "com-
prehensive plan to preserve structures of historic or aesthetic interest
requiring government to pay for private expectations generated by the action (or
lack of action) of government employees. Although Justice Rehnquist claimed
government could not be estopped, he held it could be forced to pay compensation
for public rights "lost" by the silence of administrators. One wonders whether this
is a valid distinction. In an era of fiscal restraint, public rights can be forfeited
as effectively by the requirement of compensation as they can by estoppel.
Interestingly, Justice Rehnquist's claim that the government cannot be estopped
is hardly settled law. The cases upon which he relied, in fact, expressly declined
to address the issue. See INS v. Hibi, 414 U.S. 5,8 (1973) ; Montana v. Kennedy,
366 U.S. 308, 315 (1961). Although several circuit courts of appeal and state
courts have accepted the theory of administrative estoppel, see, e.g., Podea v.
Acheson, 179 F.2d 306, 309 (2d Cir. 1950) ; Glover v. AFSD, 46 Or. App, 829,
835, 613 P.2d 495,499 (1980), Justice Frankfurter held in 1947, "Whatever the
form in which the Government functions, anyone entering into an arrangement
with the Government takes the risk of having accurately ascertained that he who
purports to act for the Government stays within the bounds of his authority." Fed.
Crop Ins. Corp. v, Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 384 (1947). See generally Note, Equitable
Estoppel Against Government, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 551 (1979).
122 100 S. Ct. at 386. The Corps' only comment to the developers was that the
"deepening of the channel may cause erosion of the beach." Id.
123 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
124 Id. at 132.
125 The contemplated use was expressly acknowledged by the Court as being
consistent with general social policy as expressed in the City's zoning laws. Id. at
116.
126 N.Y.C. Admin. Code ch. 8--A, § 205-1.0 (1976).
127 438 U.S. at 128--31.
128 Id. at 132.
129 Id. at 136.
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wherever they might be found in the city ...."130 In a footnote, Justice
Brennan added that an individual's property rights could be singled
out for less favorable treatment if necessary to implement the objectives
of the overall historic preservation program.F"
Historic preservation and public recreational water rights both seek
to secure public rights of use 132 while leaving the underlying property
in private ownership. Each accomplishes this goal at the expense of a
valuable privilege of the owner, be it high-rise development or depri-
vation of recreational solitude. Most importantly, clearly-stated rights
of public use, like historic preservation, can likely inflict these "losses"
without compensation when done pursuant to a general plan designed
to enhance the societal value of "private" property, a societal value that
inheres in the unique nature of water resources as well as in a marvelous
structure like Grand Central Station.P"
Apart from its guidance on the takings issue, Penn Central also offers
insights which can aid the political acceptability of expanded public
water rights. In Penn Central, the owners of Grand Central Station had
been granted transferable development rights to mitigate their pecuni-
ary loss, a factor which Justice Brennan took into account in consider-
ing the impact of regulation.P" These development rights helped to
make the restrictions on Penn Central less unfair. While the absence of
such mitigation hardly characterizes government action, ipso facto, as
a taking, its presence can dispel perceived unfairness and enhance a
regulatory scheme's political acceptability. As will be explored in Part
II, the government can and should "mitigate" the adverse impacts
of public recreational water use by creating and enforcing adequate
regulations for use of the resource.P"
II
A PREFERRED MODEL FOR GOVERNMENTAL ACTION
A. The General Warrant for Legislative Action
There is a meaningful sense in which Part I of this Article can
130 Id. at 132.
1311d. at 132 n.28 (quoting the decision below, Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City
of New York, 42 N.Y.2d 324, 330, 366 N.E.2d 1271, 1275,397 N.Y.S.2d 914, 918
(1977)).
132 The public "uses" historic buildings by enjoying them as part of their cul-
tural and architectural heritage. Continued use of Grand Central Station as a
train station is a fortuitous public benefit and not necessary to the use of the build-
ing as an historic landmark.
133 To be free of a compensation requirement does not destroy the possibility
that perceived inequity may make compensation a governmental choice. See Sax,
Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.]. 149, 177-78 (1971) ;
c], Michelman, supra note 47, at 1214-24 (describing the conditions under which
"unfairness" renders compensation less costly to society than regulation alone).
134 438 U.S. at 137.
135 See text accompanying notes 195-227 infra.
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stand alone in establishing public rights in all recreationally valuable
waters. These rights, inherent in the natural law antecedents of Anglo-
American law and the concept of government trusteeship, can and
should be recognized as presently existing rights, requiring no affirma-
tive government action save their judicial recognition as controlling
principles. For judges to do so, however, raises a potential conflict with
the broadest readings of Kaiser Aetna which suggest that compensa-
tion must be paid whenever exclusive recreational use is destroyed.P"
Although, as noted in Part I, there are grounds of distinction between
Kaiser Aetna and the central thesis of this Article.P" full acceptance
of the suitability-for-use measurement of public rights leads inescapably
to the conclusion that Kaiser Aetna was wrongly decided. The Kaiser
Aetna majority failed to appreciate both traditional and recent recogni-
tion of public water rights. Instead, it improvidently relegated them to
the realm of "[0]ld, unhappy, far off things, and battles long ago."138
The major purpose of this Article, however, is to establish a coherent
governmental response to the problem of recreational shortfall, thus,
the profound disagreement with Kaiser Aetna need not be a stumbling
block. As Part II will attempt to demonstrate, there are adequate dis-
tinctions between the model advocated by this Article and the Kaiser
Aetna situation.P" The initial concern is to identify reasons why the
legislature should act in the public's behalf.
There is substantial room for expansion of public recreational water
rights at the present time. Not all states have adopted positions as favor-
able to public recreation as the suitability-for-use standard.v'? More-
over, most states adopting that test or its equivalent do so rather indi-
rectly, relying on common law reasoning to explain statutory enact-
ments. For example, the suitability-for-use tests articulated in Hall-
den14 1 and Picabo Livestock142 occurred against clear statutory back-
drops that defined public rights in terms of navigability.143 The result
136 100 S. Ct. at 393.
137 See text accompanying notes 100-18 supra.
138 100 S. Ct. at 391.
139 See notes 195-227 and accompanying text infra.
140 For an excellent catalogue of the various positions of the western states,
see Johnson & Austin, supra note 7, at 33-52. No comparable compilation exists
for eastern states but the diversity of views is at least as great. Compare Bartke,
supra note 41, with Comment, Public Recreation on Nonnavigable Lakes and the
Doctrine of Reasonable Use, 55 IOWA L. REv. 1064 (1970) and Note, Water and
Watercourses-Recreational Rights-A Determination of the Public Status of
West Virginia Streams, 80 W. VA. L. REV. 356 (1978).
141 51 Mich. App, 176,214 N.W.2d 856 (1974) (discussed in text accompanying
notes 65-74 supra) . .
142 96 Idaho 360, 528 P.2d 1295 (1974) (discussed in text accompanying notes
77-82 supra).
148 See text accompanying notes 64-82 supra.
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is a somewhat curious legal hybrid whose vitality may not be clear.
Thus, even in states that have achieved rough approximations of this
Article's thesis, there remains an apparent reticence to adopt a consist-
ent legislative and judicial position that public rights should be solely a
function of the recreational value of the waters involved.
To affirmatively persuade governments to expand water rights, in-
quiry must proceed in several directions. First, the need for expanded
opportunities must be demonstrated. Second, the societal preference for
private market distribution of goods and services must be overcome.
Third, the expansion of public rights must be proven functional, ad-
ministrable, and most important for present purposes, legally and
politically acceptable.
B. The Demand For Water Recreation and the
Inadequacies of Market Supply
Public demand for water-based recreation is well-documented.w'
Michigan, for example, has nearly 700,000 registered boats.14 5 In Cali-
fornia, participation in swimming and boating is the fastest growing of
all outdoor recreation activities.P" One study indicated that almost half
the national population preferred water recreation to any other type. 14 i
It is not surprising, therefore, that water recreation is already recog-
nized as a public good,' as evidenced by government action to facilitate
public use.148 Simultaneously, however, the market system has at-
tempted to provide private recreational opportunities.P'' One tenet of
this Article is that the market system is an inadequate mechanism to
provide needed public rights of use.150
Currently, the benefits associated with water recreation are poorly
distributed. This conclusion rests upon the premise that water resources
should be widely shared.15 i If this assumption is correct, it is proper to
view unsatisfied demand for water recreation, despite an apparently
adequate supply of resources.P- as proof that the market system has not
144 See Comment, Water Recreation-Public Use of "Private" Waters, 52
CALIF. L. REV. 171, 171 (1964); Note, Public Recreation and Subdivisions on
Lakes and Reservoirs in California, 23 STAN. L. REV. 811, 811 (1971).
145 Detroit Free Press, June 17,1980, § B at 1.
146 CALIFORNIA DEP'T OF PARKS AND RECREATION, CALIFORNIA RECREATION
AND PARKS STUDy-PART II at 179 (1965).
14i U.S. OUTDOOR RECREATION RESOURCES REVIEW COMM'N, OUTDOOR RECREA-
TION FOR AMERICA, A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND TO THE CONGRESS 173 (1962).
148 C]. R. MUSGRAVE, A THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE 42 (1959) (defining as
public goods those produced under public management).
149 See Note, supra note 144.
150 See P. STEINER, PUBLIC EXPENDITURE BUDGETING 9, 14-16 (1969).
151See text accompanying notes 15-36 supra.
152 See, e.g., MICHIGAN DEP'T OF NATURAL RESOURCES, supra note 1, at 47
(advocating state intervention upon finding of adequate, but under-utilized re-
source base in conjunction with unsatisfied demand for recreational water use).
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adequately distributed the benefit.P" It is the thesis of this Article,
moreover, that the market is functionally incapable of adequately dis-
tributing the recreational resource.P!
One problem is that an individual or firm may enjoy a monopoly
position in a recreational-waters market or submarket. This would
occur, for example, if one owner held all the land surrounding a lake in
or near a metropolitan area. As a result, that individual's profit-maxi-
mizing strategy may artificially restrict recreational opportunity well
below the capacity of the resource to support high quality recreation.P"
The fortuity of land ownership patterns should not allow a monopolist
to withhold recreational opportunities from the public.
A second problem lies in the common-pool aspect of water resources.
One feature of a commons, such as water, is that shared usufructuary
rights often lead to overuse, destroying the resource value for all.156 In
a lake surrounded by numerous owners, for example, all would have a
like incentive to provide public access and maximize revenues. When
all littoral owners compete, the resulting degree of public use may make
economic sense but create ecological disaster. The tragedy of the com-
mons157 is compounded because private developments, which might
enhance resource quality or the quality of the recreational experience,
are discouraged.V" Lack of control over access provided by others dis-
courages individual investments which depend on common amenity
values. An unregulated commons cannot protect the profit incentives
needed to protect the resource or to produce an adequate variety-P'' of
recreational opportunity.
Market distribution is also distorted by two final problems: legal un-
certainty and transaction costs. Legal uncertainty is created by ambigu-
ous limitations on private use (which usually rely on a "reasonable-
ness" standard) 160 and changeable definitions of public rights which
tend to fluctuate over time.l'" The resultant uncertainty, much like the
problems of the common pool, deter individual investment in resource
improvement. Market distribution is also distorted by relatively high
153 See note 150 supra.
154 C], P. STEINER, supra note 150, at 9-14 (canvassing externalities and market
imperfections as preconditions of recognition of need for public goods).
155 See generally J. BAIN, A THEORY OF PRICE205-10 (1967) ; R. LEFTWICH,
THE PRICE SYSTEM AND RESOURCE ALLOCATION 2()()""()3 (3d ed. 1966).
156 See Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
157 ld,
158 Id,
159 But cf. text accompanying note 174 infra (recognizing demands for high-
quality recreation).
160 The central element of riparianisrn and littoralism has long been the doc-
trine of "reasonable" use. See, e.g., 1 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAw
384 (1st ed. 1828).
161 See text accompanying notes 64-70 & 75-82 supra.
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transaction costS.162 Providing consumer information, for example, is
more expensive if left to independent, competing entrepreneurs than if
provided in a single governmental pamphlet to a statewide audience.
In defense of markets, it might be urged that maldistribution of rec-
reational opportunity reflects the original maldistribution of rights and
wealth and not the virtue of the market system itself, which operates
neutrally on pre-existing conditions.P" The virtue of neutrality, how-
ever, renders markets ineffective if social policy requires a deliberate
redistribution of wealth. Nonetheless, many economists seek tocorrect
this deficiency by making money transfers to the victims of the original
maldistribution.P- They argue that the public will manifest its true
preferences for water recreation by the manner in which they spend
their money. There is no simple system of transfer payments, however,
which would approach the efficiency of a governmental declaration of
public rights. The nature of recreational water rights does not allow
quantification of their relative value nor easy identification of their bene-
ficiaries.t'" At bottom, the private market system cannot conveniently
redistribute a resource on a basis which corresponds to the in-kind
benefits associated with public usufructuary rights.l'"
C. Toward Optimum Governmental Action:
Weighing Benefits and Costs
This Article suggests governmental intervention based on three posi-
tions. First, the public has a right to use any suitable water for recre-
ation. Second, government should condemn adjacent fast lands to create
162 Transaction costs arise because transactions themselves often cost money.
Professor Calabresi uses the example of the costs involved in getting large num-
bers of people together to bargain. Calabresi, Transaction. Costs, Resource Allo-
cation and Liability Rules-A Comment, 11 }. OF L. & ECON. 67, 68 n.5 (1968).
163 See, e.q., P. SAMUELSON, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 203-53
(1947) ; R. LEFTWICH, supra note ISS, at 17-18.
164 See, e.q., M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 158 (1962) ; Buchanan,
What Kind of Redistribution Do We Want?, 35 ECONOMICA 185 (1968).
165 The beneficiaries of maximum public rights would not be an homogeneous
socio-economic group as is frequently the case with many existing "welfare" pro-
grams. Instead, the group would be all those, rich and poor, who do not presently
have rights to recreational water use and who have heretofore been unwilling or
unable to pay the price set by the private market system or to avail themselves of
existing public opportunities.
166 See P. STEINER, supra note 150, where he states: "This familiar argument
does not persuade, if one regards as legitimate a desire of society to interfere with
the pattern of consumption that would result from market determinations. A soci-
ety may choose to affect income distribution and the pattern of consumption
jointly." Id. at 16. See also Thurow, Government Expenditures: Cash or In-Kind,
5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 361, 362-66 (1975) (in-kind transfers may be justified be-
cause conferring the specific benefit increases welfare of donor class).
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access to public waters.l'" Third, compensation for these fast lands need
not reflect the private landowners' loss of exclusive water use. Should
a state wish to adopt all three positions, the tools are readily available.
A legislature could recognize public rights pursuant to its general police
power. Access could be provided under existing condemnation laws 168
with compensation awards limited to fast-land values. If funding per-
mitted, all recreationally valuable waters could be made available for
public use, truly a maximum solution but not necessarily an optimum
one. Once-the maximum power of the government has been established,
practical problems arise in determining precisely when and how public
opportunity should be expanded.
The reason to restrain maximum governmental action defies easy
categorization. It includes considerations usually weighed by legisla-
tures concerning prospective benefits and costs. The benefits, of course,
are increased public use of the state's recreationally valuable waters.
Beyond brief references to the monetary cost of acquiring public access,
this Article has not yet addressed the issue of costs. Since private mar-
kets are not adequate decision-making mechanisms, government must
scrutinize the question of costs for itself.169
The tangible costs-"? of government action will seldom be high. The
enactment of legislation and purchase of property have no consumptive
resource costs. The costs of clearing and paving access roads, parking
lots, and maintaining limited support facilities are likely to be small
compared to the corresponding recreational benefits.F! The tangible
costs of declining resource quality may be more significant. Overcrowd-
167 See text accompanying notes 192-94 infra.
168 Authority to condemn is usually vested in state administrative agencies by
legislation passed pursuant to authority granted by the state constitution. See
generally 6 J. SACKMAN, NICHOLS' THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN §§ 25.1-.7
(rev. 3d ed. 1979).
Existing condemnation powers have been used to provide recreational access.
See, e.q., Branch v. Oconto County, 13 Wis. 2d 595,109 N.W.2d 105 (1961) (duck
hunting) ; Salisbury Land & Imp. Co. v. Commonwealth, 215 Mass. 371, 102 N.E.
619 (1913) (public beach and bathinghouse).
169 Cj. Johnson, Planning Without Prices: A Discussion of Land Use Regu-
lation Without Compensation, in PLANNING WITHOUT PRICES 63 (B. Siegan ed.
1977) (noting the peril of government action absent price constraints).
170 The term "tangible costs" is simply meant to describe those costs with direct
physical consequences associated with them. These costs are in contrast to costs
which result from the reactions of individuals to employment of the model. C].
Michelrnan, supra note 47, at 1214-18 (defining and exemplifying demoralization
costs associated with uncompensated "takings" of property).
171 The relevant benefits are limited to those associated with the increase in
recreation. No meaningful recapture of costs should be expected from state-
imposed user charges. In Michigan, for example, the fees collected for use of state
water recreation areas do not even cover the operational budget of the facilities.
See MICHIGAN DEP'T OF NATURAL RESOURCES, supra note I, at 62--Q4.
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ing of recreational waters can devalue the quality of recreation. Addi-
tionally, recreational uses have environmental costs, such as the intro-
duction of water pollutants. These costs may be minimized, however, if
expanded use is kept within the carrying capacity of the resource.F"
In spite of government regulation, the possible loss of exclusive recre-
ational opportunities may create indirect costs. Some users may entirely
forego their recreation because of the lack of relative solitude. Other
users, who have already made significant investments with the expecta-
tion of exclusive use, may suffer demoralization Iosses.F" These losses,
in turn, may be felt sympathetically by wider segments of the public at
large. In a sense, the basis of these costs lies in the value American
society places on recreational solitude. One can easily appreciate the
contrast between canoeing in a wilderness area or an exclusive resort
and canoeing armada-style on an overcrowded stream. Heretofore,
recreational solitude has often been preserved by private landowners at
the expense of public rights.F" The elimination of this private power, if
coupled with universal provision of public access by government, makes
it possible that opportunities for solitude may decline. While a legisla-
ture might readily accept this result, a better solution may be to temper
provision of public rights to preserve opportunities for enjoying soli-
tude.F"
Apart from the potential reduction of opportunities for solitude, there
remains the problem of demoralization losses. Professor Michelman, in
a slightly different context.F" has theorized that governmental regula-
tion which disproportionately burdens an individual owner may be
widely perceived as so unfair that it destroys the public confidence ne-
cessary to promote the expenditure of capital and labor on new socially
valuable ventures. Several factors reduce the likelihood that expanded
public water rights cause widespread demoralization losses. First, as
developed previously, few owners are situated in such a way that their
172 These costs are difficult to quantify butthey seem to be insignificant as long
as the refinements of the model to prevent overuse are employed. See text accom-
panying notes 195-200 inira. Carrying capacity is defined in Kusler, Carrying
Capacity Controls for Recreation Water Uses, 1973 WIS. L. REV. 1,4-7.
173 See Michelrnan, supra note 47, at 1214. The problem of demoralization losses
is discussed in the text accompanying notes 176-81 infra.
174 In addition to this type of private action there is also a stock of pristine
recreational sites open to the public such as the Boundary Lakes National Canoe
Area in Minnesota.
175 The choices involved in using the model to insure continued provision of
high-quality recreation are discussed in text accompanying notes 199-200 inira.
176 Professor Michelrnan is concerned with giving content to the fifth amend-
ment compensation requirement. He argues that a utilitarian calculus be employed
which includes demoralization losses and urges that compensation be paid in those
cases where social costs would be thereby minimized. See Michelman, supra note
47, at 1218-24.
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losses will besevere enough to prompt demoralization in others. Second,
part of Michelmari's demoralization losses stem from the perception
that the burden has been impressed arbitrarily.F! If the loss results
from an evenhanded application of a generally accepted program, no
demoralization occurs.F" Third, to the extent government limits the
quantity of public use and engages in sound resource management.F''
the severity of the loss is further reduced. Thus, a touchstone of model
government action should be protection of the amenity value of the
recreational resource.
A very few cases may remain, however, in which even a good regula-
tory and management program fails to avert all demoralization costs.P?
In these cases, amortization.P! a device borrowed from the zoning field,
might be employed to allow the private owner temporary enjoyment of
exclusive rights. Similarly, increasing public access gradually can also
lessen the severity of the owner's loss.
D. Specific Limitations on Public Recreation
Although government should respond appropriately to public demand
for recreation, not all waters must be open for maximum public access
and use. Any governmental action is likely to be protested by the af-
fected private owners.P" These protests may attack the necessity for
expanded public use or claim that a particular body of water is unsuited
to additional uses. To responsibly address these questions, the decision-
makerl 83 must have an adequate information base consisting of two
primary components: an account of public demand and an accurate
census of the resource base. The decisionmaker must then establish a
clear goal for utilizing the available resources and adopt an approach
which insures its attainment.
177 See Michelman, supra note 47, at 1217.
178 See also text accompanying notes 119-33 supra (discussing non-arbitrari-
ness as relevant to the takings issue).
179 The suggested model requires systematic planning and regulation. See text
accompanying notes 195-200 infra.
180 The rarity of these cases may be further insured by an administrative
policy which considers the fairness of destroying exclusivity as a factor in the
decisionmaking process.
181 See, e.q., Harbison v. City of Buffalo, 4 N.Y.2d 553, 152 N.E.2d 42, 176
N.Y.S.2d 598 (1958) (recognizing short-term continuation of the owner's present
use as "compensation" for ultimate prevention of the use).
182 See note 145 supra.
183 The term "decisionmaker" is employed to allow flexibility to the states. The
legislature may wish to act directly through its committee system or its general
deliberative process. The decision may be delegated to an administrative agency
of the state's executive branch. The locus of the decision is immaterial to the sound
exercise of the model.
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1. Indicia of Need
One premise of this Article is that current demand for water recre-
ation remains unsatisfied. Any state wishing to employ the model should
begin by measuring the extent of this unmet demand. The detailed
design of such a study is a task best left to those with suitable expertise.
Present purposes will be satisfied by delineating some areas of particular
interest.
Water-based recreation is enjoyed by a heterogeneous group whose
members are drawn from a broad cross-section of society. Their recre-
ational preferences and disposable incomes vary. Nonetheless, some
generalizations are possible. The advocated model has a tendency to
expand the recreational opportunities of the less well-to-do; affiuent
users are more likely to have already purchased their "place in the
sun."184 Thus, any study of demand should pay particular attention to
the needs of middle and lower socio-economic groups. Reciprocally,
however, the study should also ascertain the effects of expanded public
use on those who currently enjoy relative recreational solitude. It should
be noted that the model may not necessarily reduce the enjoyment of
solitude. Frequently, the low use rates resulting in solitude are less a
function of access limitation than the product of relative inconveni-
ence.185 In any event, an accurate measurement of demand must be
sophisticated enough to reflect concern about the qualitative, as well as
the quantitative, aspects of recreational demand.
2. Indicia of Resource Suitability
The public's right to use suitable waters for recreation in part requires
some definition of suitability. To this end, a comprehensive catalogue of
a state's recreationally valuable waters should be compiled. The cata-
logue should consider fundamental factors such as the size of a body of
water, its carrying capacity.P" and its proximity to population centers.
The catalogue must also answer two difficult questions: (1) which
waters have minimal recreational value? and (2) what kinds of use are
suitable in a given lake or stream?
To answer the first question, the catalogue must set criteria to deter-
184 See Note, supra note 144.
185 But ct. note 174 supra (noting that not all solitude opportunities are a func-
tion of remoteness).
186 Carrying capacity is the ability to support a particular number of users.
Obviously this is in large measure a function of size. A big lake can generally
support more users than a small lake. Carrying capacity, however, may be deter-
mined by other ecological variables. Land-locked, spring-fed lakes, for example,
may be less able to cleanse themselves of pollutants than lakes which are part of a
system of flowing waters. Accordingly, the spring-fed lake might be endangered
by a use rate lower than that of otherwise similar lakes. It would be described as
having a lower carrying capacity. A far more thorough discussion of carrying
capacity determinations is found in Kusler, supra note 172.
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mine the recreational value of a water body.P" If, as determined by
these criteria, the water has only minimal value, care must be taken to
avoid additional use. Increases in public use would have a greater effect
on surrounding landowners than if the water had a higher recreational
value. In turn, these owners could support their claims of unfairness by
noting that theirs is the "hard" case, close to the line which should leave
them free of regulation.P"
The foregoing observations may seem to suggest that the resource
catalogue can minimize problems of marginal value by including only
waters of obvious recreational worth. Such a conclusion,' however, loses
sight of the catalogue's function. The catalogue is an aid to the decision-
maker, it is not by itself a decisional instrument. Opening to public use
marginally valuable resources in close proximity to a metropolitanre-
gion might be a crucial means of responding to local demand. The trade-
offs involved are essentially political and should therefore be made by
a well-informed decisionmaker, not sub silentio by an informational
document. Accordingly, the catalogue must include an account of even
marginal resources so that their inclusion or rejection in a recreation
plan represents a conscious determination of policy.
The second question concerns the suitability of particular waters.
While a vast marsh with shallow expanses of open water may be suited
to canoeing or duck hunting, it is unsuited for swimming or water-
skiing. In general, suitability can be the subject of set criteria.P''' None-
theless, the catalogue should also attempt comparative evaluations. The
marsh, for example, may be best suited to duck hunting but also valu-
able for other types of recreation. The competing recreational uses
should be arrayed in the catalogue to give the decisionmaker choices
among clearly articulated alternatives.
Having compiled data about need, recreational value, and suitability,
187An example of the issues which arise might be helpful. A small stream im-
passable to canoes and without a viable fish population is probably not recreation-
ally valuable. However, if such a stream has a number of deep holes well-suited
for swimming, its lack of value for recreation is no longer patent.
188'The cases are "hard" insofar as they present the landowner's legal and
pragmatic arguments in a favorable setting. To the extent that increased public
use of the resource threatens totally to eclipse the pre-existing private use, the
basis for claiming a taking is greater than in most applications of the model. See
text accompanying notes 100---08 supra. Pragmatically, since the heightened de-
gree of owner hardship in these cases produces only marginal' recreational benefits
for the public, such an application of the model appears to be politically unattrac-
tive.
189Again, an example may be useful. One such criterion might be that only
lakes having at least twenty-five acres of surface area are suitable for waterskiing.
A degree of circumspection must be exercised when adopting such rules. The rules
should reflect prevailing practice; if waterskiing frequently occurs on twenty-acre
lakes, a twenty-five acre standard is not justifiable. '
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the impacts of proposed changes in recreational use should be evaluated.
A process similar to the now familiar environmental impact statement
might be useful. The consequences of suggested alternatives should be
assessed, with care taken to solicit the suggestions of interested citizens.
3. A General Standard for the Decisionmaker
The data collected regarding demand and resource suitability will
sometimes suggest the path to be followed by the decisionmaker. Vast,
unsatisfied demand and suitable resources counsel governmental action
to expand public rights. This is, however, guidance in gross; it offers
no guide by which to determine how much state intervention is desir-
able. Absent a general standard for decisionmakers, the employment of
the model might prove haphazard or arbitrary.
The core problem is one of reconciling conflicting or at least compet-
ing forms of resource use. Writing in a different context, Professor
Sax suggests a general procedure for rationally resolving competing
demands for use of a resource complex.P? One attempts to ascertain
the course of action which would be pursued if the entire complex were
owned by a single individual or firm. While the primary aim of Sax's
inquiry is designed to eliminate disregard of externalities in decision-
making his unified perspective is of assistance to a model program of
water recreation.
Assuming a single entity distributed water recreation, it would seek
that combination of uses which maximizes benefits. This strategy is
similar to that used by a private manufacturer which sells a line of re-
lated products. In assessing the demand for its goods, the firm scruti-
nizes the specific components of demand, as well as its aggregate
strength. As a result, the firm may try to produce a variety of related
products which allows it to satisfy the needs of the greatest number of
consumers.P! Similarly, the water recreation decisionmaker must con-
sider whether there are discriminate demands which can all be satis-
fied by using the model as a complement to private market activity.
It is entirely possible, of course, that a resource base cannot be used
to satisfy all types of recreation demand. The unique nature of a river,
stream, or marsh may make it suitable for only one type of use. In the
difficult trade-offs, however, the governmental decisionmaker should
190 See Sax, supra note 133, at 172. Professor Sax was there concerned with
regulatory schemes which preferred one private use over another and with the
more general problem of the takings issue.
191 The firm would like to satisfy all segments of the demand curve. This is
sometimes done by selling a small amount of their product to those relatively few
consumers willing to purchase at the highest prices, while marketing and selling
slightly differentiated products each of which appeals to increasingly lower-priced
segments of the demand curve. See, e.q., ]. BAIN, supra note 155, at 400-01; R.
LEFTWICH, supra note 155, at 197-200.
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rely on those values which justified expansion of public use in the first
place. The communal or societal interest in water resources, recognized
by the ancients and reaffirmed in the modern era, suggests that quanti-
tative concerns be given preference. Accordingly, the decisionmaker
should employ a calculus which makes recreational waters accessible to
larger numbers of people. Such an equation need not create uncontrolled
public use; it merely announces that the goal of providing recreational
opportunities for a large number of people generally supersedes the
goal of providing low-density opportunities. Coupled with a concern for
resources suitability, this order of priority provides a standard by which
opportunities for recreational water use should be allocated.
4. Public Access
Apart from governmental articulation of public rights of use, the
public must be able to reach the water in order to make use of it. In
many cases, public access is already adequate, most commonly due to
public ownership of riparian or littoral lands. In these cases, govern-
ment can actively promote access by providing boat launching ramps
and marina facilities or more passively, by simply allowing the public
to enter waters from adjoining public lands or roadways. There remain,
however, a group of recreationally valuable waters without existing
public access.P'' The paradigm of this situation is the small, but recre-
ationally-valuable, spring-fed lake completely surrounded by private
property.
Without access, public usufructuary rights have little value. While
access might be provided in several ways, the simplest practice is gov-
ernmental condemnation of sufficient rights-of-way. The power to con-
demn is indisputable in these situations because it promotes the common
good, satisfying the legal requirement that takings of private property
be for public use. 193 One key issue, however, is the level of compensa-
tion. The price to be paid for acquiring access is of utmost practical im-
portance. If public rights are to be viable, the fiscal burden cannot be
too great. If, for example, government were forced to condemn not only
an access road but all lands surrounding a lake, available state funds
would be quickly exhausted. Similarly, if compensation for public
rights-of-way were required to reflect the private landowner's loss of
exclusivity, the resultant fiscal burden would be prohibitive. Such a
requirement, however, would simply recast the proposition that de-
struction of exclusivity constitutes a taking. Since the claim fails in all
but the most unusual and extreme cases.l'" it would likewise fail here.
192 See note 145 supra.
193 See 2A J. SACKMAN, supra note 168, § 7.1.
194 See United States v. Rands, 389 U.s. 121 (1967); United States v. Twin
City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222 (1956). See generally text accompanying notes 83-
135 supra. Special note should be given to the discussion of non-compensability of
losses attributable to use of adjacent waters.
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E. Employing the Model Responsibly
Once recreationally valuable waters are identified, public rights to
their use expressed, and access provided, the regulatory obligations of
responsible government need to take effect. This section seeks to define
these obligations, focusing first on resource quality controls and, second,
on mechanisms to reduce the burden on private landowners.
1. Regulatory Protection of Amenity Vclues
If the model creates a new class of recreational users, it poses a set
of dangers to existing amenity values. Currently, users of private waters
are riparian and littoral owners or their licensees. In general, their pro-
prietary interest works to preserve the positive characteristics of the
lake or stream. In addition, peer pressure from the interested commu-
nity also works to maintain water qualities. This pressure is reinforced
by the relatively unchanging pattern of land ownership surrounding
recreationally attractive waters.
The expansion of public rights creates a larger class of users, includ-
ing those who may lack a continuing relationship to the resource and
the corresponding incentives to preserve its qualities.P" Moreover, the
sheer number of these additional users, if unchecked, might devalue the
common recreational experience. Evidence of these dangers has already
surfaced in lawsuits which have claimed resource misuse by littoral
owners' Iicensees.P" In these cases, relief has often been granted based
on the riparian doctrine that owners, including government, are limited
to reasonable use of the resource.P? Increased public use, however, may
strain the effectiveness of this doctrine. Because the model suggests
public rights that are independent of land ownership, the applicability
of the reasonable use doctrine is far from clear. l08
To promote amenity values, a responsible program of water recre-
ation should establish protective regulations. In fact, such regulations
may be required. In Penn Central, public usufructuary rights did not
take private property rights, in part, because of mitigation measures
used by the City of New York,190 Analogously, governmental pro-
tection of amenity values might also be required in order to mitigate
195 The significance of the model in contributing to this class is not trivial be-
cause the model should not be employed absent a finding of significant unsatisfied
demand for recreational opportunities. See text accompanying notes 184 & 185
supra.
106 See, e.g., Botton v. State, 69 Wash. 2d 751, 420 P.2d 352 (1966); Snively
v. Jaber, 48 Wash. 2d 815, 296 P.2d 1015 (1956).
107 See, e.g., Botton v. State, 69 Wash. 2d 751, 420 P.2d 352 (1966).
108 Lacking ownership of riparian or littoral lands, the normal predicate for the
reasonable use limitation is absent. Also absent are the typical ownership oppor-
tunities for access control and licensure of recreational users.
199 438U.S. at 137.
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the public's interference with landowners' enjoyment of high-quality
water recreation. Moreover, condemnation of access is constrained by
the rule that the government may take no more than is necessary to
serve the public purpose.t?? As the public has an interest only in recrea-
tionally suitable waters which are, in part, defined in qualitative terms,
it can be argued that there is no public purpose in creating access to
overcrowded (unsuitable) waters. As a result, the ability to condemn
access may depend on regulatory protection of amenity values.
2. Enforcement of Regulation
Governmental regulation would be primarily directed at preventing
two types of abuse: overuse of the water resource and unauthorized
use of adjacent private lands. Both of these dangers might be met by
regulatory strategies that have already been developed as general water
management tools. The primary regulatory methods are access meter-
ing and lake zoning. 201 Secondary controls on overuse or misuse include
such devices as fishing license requirements, daily catch limits, anti-
littering statutes, the provision of convenient refuse receptacles or em-
ployment of clean-up crews. While these devices theoretically amelio-
rate the dangers to amenity values, further attention must be given to
the gap between theory and practice. In spite of government's good
intentions regarding enforcement, it is not difficult to foresee practical
obstacles, such as understaffing, which would hamper acceptable results.
One consequence of the past failures of regulatory agencies has been
sporadic lawsuits by private riparian and littoral owners to enjoin con-
duct that unreasonably affected amenity values.202 The practical ob-
stacles to such suits, however, are cost and uncertainty of victory. An
adversely-affected landowner must carry the burden on issues such as
irreparability of harm203 and the balance of equities.P'" Trespass actions
are somewhat more likely to succeed but plaintiffs still face difficulties
suchas establishing non-trivial damages and identifying the proper de-
fendants. An isolated trespass or littering ofproperty does de minimus
damage and will not make the action monetarily worthwhile. Those
entering recreational waters are a changing set of individuals, few of
whom are likely to repeat tortious invasions of any particular tract and
none of whom, alone, are likely to have significantly degraded the re-
. 200 Excess condemnation is the acquisition by the government through eminent
domain of more property than is necessary for a public improvement. See 2A J.
SACKMAN, supra note 168, § 7.5122. .
201 See Kusler, supra note 172, at 7-19.
202 See, e.q., Botton v. State, 69 Wash. 2d 751,420 P.2d 352 (1966).
203 See, e.g., D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAw OF REMEDIES § 2.5 (1973);
O. FISS, INJUNCTIONS 9-27 (1972).
204 See, e.q., D. DOBBS, supra note 203, § 2.4, at 52-54; O. FISS, supra note 203,
at 84-91, 168.
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source. Further, they are almost by definition strangers to the immediate
area and thus enjoy a degree of anonymity which tends to insulate them
from prosecution unless physically apprehended and identified. Thus, if
traditional private remedies prove ineffectual in restraining those who
misuse the resource, landowners must force government to control the
public's actions.
Suits against government may not fare well under existing legal rules,
for suits seeking governmental enforcement must successfully run a
gauntlet of legal hurdles concerning both threshold and substantive is-
sues. Immunity, for example, may be a complete or partial bar to suit.
Many states still claim immunity for tort damages in a variety of con-
texts, some of which are arguably similar to the present problem.P'"
Further, judges are understandably reluctant to dictate to administra-
tors the methods of administration.P'" Finally, cost and inconvenience
may deter suits against state officials, particularly if state statutes limit
venue or jurisdiction to a distant forum.P'"
The substantive problems involved in a suit to compel government to
regulate or to enforce regulations are also of considerable magnitude.
One approach to such cases is to seek a writ of mandamus ordering the
responsible official to act. Issuance of the writ is usually limited to those
cases in which the official has shirked a non-discretionary duty,208 but
enforcement functions are almost invariably clothed with some degree
of discretion. An exception to this general rule may exist, however, if
the public-use and excess-condemnation arguments of the previous sec-
tion209in fact impose a duty on government to both regulate and enforce
use limitations on the general public. '
One alternative to mandamus may be to hold government vicari-
ously responsible for the tortious acts of public users. Even if viable,
such a theory is at best incomplete, for not all violations of the regula-
tions would be tortious.s'? To the extent the resource is harmed by the
acts of many, a doctrine might be developed allowing plaintiffs to aggre-
205 See generally 3 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 12.13, 25.01,
25.11 (1958).
206 See generally id., § 24.03. Ct. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976) (finding
improper federal equitable intervention into administration of local law enforce-
ment).
207 Frequently, state agencies or administrative officials cannot be sued in local
courts of general "jurisdiction. See, e.q., MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. §600.6419
(1968) (vesting exclusive jurisdiction over claims against the state in a single
court of claims).
208 See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TEXT 44&-49 (3d ed. 1972).
209 See text accompanying note 200 supra.
210 Violation of a regulatory enactment is not always considered prima facie
evidence of tortious conduct. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF'THE LAw OF TORTS
190-204 (4thed.197l).
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gate these harms to demonstrate a tortious invasion of private rights.2ll
There remains, however, the more fundamental problem of holding
government vicariously liable for the acts of the public. The crux of
many decisions concerning vicarious responsibility is the ability to
control the actor. Traditionally, mere licensure or its equivalent-'P has
been deemed inadequate control.s'" thus rendering vicarious liability of
government even more dubious.
Apart from administrative law and tort approaches, private owners
may try to sue government on a property theory. A degree of suceess
has been achieved by suing government as a co-riparian, claiming that
its use of the surface unreasonably interferes with the correlative use of
the other owners. Interestingly, the leading decision, Botton v. State/H
was originally argued and decided on an inverse-condemnation theory.215
In modifying the trial court's action which required the state to close a
public access site until it condemned the rights of all other riparians.P"
the Washington Supreme Court said:
The state, as a riparian owner, does not have to acquire by
condemnation the rights of the other riparian owners before
it permits fishermen in reasonable numbers access to the
waters of Phantom Lake; but it does have the obligation, and
counsel for the state so concede, to so regulate the number
and conduct of its licensees as to prevent any undue interfer-
ence with the rights of other riparian owners.s'"
Even Botton, however, does not adequately quiet fears that the model
will result in frequent instances of regulatory failure. The melange of
other obstacles persists and, even in Botton, the state conceded the key
issue, the existence of a duty to regulate.V" A model government pro-
gram must provide firmer, less costly assurances that regulatory powers
will be exercised.
An important assurance that can be built into the model is to prohibit
condemnation of access sites until the state proves it has devised an
211 In these tort actions the alleged invasion of right would sound in nuisance
or trespass and plaintiffs must therefore demonstrate a threshold level of inter-
ference. See id. at 63--65. 583--602.
212 The model casts government as a facilitator of access and not as a licensor
because the usufructuary rights of the public are no longer dependent on govern-
ment's proprietorship of water or adjacent land.
213 See ""V. PROSSER. supra note 210, at 376--85,458--61. But see Botton v. State,
69 Wash. 2d 751, 420 P.2d 352 (1966) (discussed in text accompanying notes
214-18 infra).
214 69 Wash. 2d 751. 420 P.2d 352 (1966).
215 [d. at 753, 420 P.2d at 354.
216 [d.
217 [d. at 757, 420 P.2d at 356.
218 [d. at 753-54, 420 P.2d at 354.
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adequate regulatory and enforcement scherne.P'' The cost of contest-
ing the scheme's adequacy would remain marginal because the land-
owner is already party to the condemnation, the forum is necessarily
local,220 and the burden of proof rests with government to affirmatively
demonstrate adequacy.F! If desired, the model might go further and
provide that any condemnation award may include reasonable attor-
ney's fees for non-frivolous litigation of the adequacy-of-regulation
issue. Finally, intervention-as-of-right should be allowed to any other
riparian or littoral owners on the water body, and intervention-by-leave-
of-court should be allowed to any other individual or group expressing
an interest in the regulatory scheme. Such procedures would assure the
promulgation of public controls in a forum convenient to those most
immediately concerned with the adequacy of the regulations.
Problems of enforcement can also be overcome within the condemna-
tion proceeding. To avoid the shortcomings of the mandamus or vi-
carious liability theories and the expense of protracted litigation, a
remedial scheme might be substituted which relies on procedures de-
veloped in the area of civil contempt of court.222 If the judgment of
condemnation incorporates an injunction which allows public access
only upon implementation of an approved regulatory plan, a new pro-
tection would be available for the landowners: failure to comply with
the injunction would result in contempt of court.223 The landowner
would need only go to the local forum and show the plan's non-enforce-
ment to establish a prima facie case of civil contempt. Remedies for
contempt include damages for harm done, directives that enforcement
occur, or imprisonment of responsible parties to compel obedience.P'
Moreover, civil contempt decrees routinely award the costs incurred in
enforcing the previously granted injunctive rights.225
Although it may be unwise to attempt it, the injunction and contempt
mechanism also provides a plausible legal avenue for direct private en-
forcement of the regulations against members of the public. While these
219 Typically condemnation statutes require their exercise to be accomplished
via judicial hearing. See 6 ]. SACKMAN, supra note 168, § 26.11. The model here
proposes adding an element to the state's required showing.
220 Most states have jurisdictional and venue requirements requiring a local
forum in condemnation cases. See, e.q., id., § 24.7.
221 The potential sovereign immunity problem, previously discussed in text ac-
companying note 205 supra, is obviated by the waiver implicit in state-initiated
proceedings.
222 See generally D. DOBBS, supra note 203, § 2.9; O. FISS, supra note 203, at
70~74.
223 See generally D. DOBBS, supra note 203, § 2.9; O. FISS, supra note 203, at
70~74.
224 See generally D. DOBBS, supra note 203, § 2.9; O. FISS, supra note 203, at
739-74.
225 See generally D. DOBBS, supra note 203, § 3.8.
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recreational users were not parties to the original suit which gave rise
to the injunction, knowing disobedience of an injunction is sometimes
treated as contempt of court.226 In such an action, the landowner would
have the benefit of definite standards of conduct established by the
regulatory injunction and would not need to rely on the more amor-
phous standards applicable in trespass or nuisance suits. The costs of
obtaining the remedy could be charged to the violator but the problems
of identifying and subsequently locating the violator would persist. It
also might be difficult-to charge the violator with sufficient notice of the
injunctive standards. For these reasons, contempt citations may prove
most useful in the event of repeated violations by an identified individual,
previously warned of the offensive nature of his conduct.
The preceding discussion has been limited to cases where the state
resorts to condemnation to provide access for the public's usufructuary
rights. Frequently, a state will already own access sites and merely
need to alter its law to expand the public's rights. Although the justifi-
cations for concomitant regulation would apply, the expedient of a
specialized condemnation decree would not be available. In such cases,
a legislative enactment which recognizes public rights might require the
appropriate state regulatory agency to bring a lawsuit which would
fulfill the same function.P?
CONCLUSION
This Article began by claiming that all naturally existing recre-
ationally valuable waters are available for public recreational use. Sup-
port for this conclusion was found in both ancient and modern law and
was reconciled with the recent "takings" pronouncements of the United
States Supreme Court. In its later stages, the Article discussed the
limitations on expanding public recreational opportunities and devel-
oped a model for responsible governmental action.
The recreational value of natural waters is a uniquely public asset.
The concept of public water rights can be traced from Roman law to the
English doctrine of inalienable royal stewardship to early American
notions of navigability. In American water law, the development of
the federal navigation servitude, state ownership of bottomlands and
waters, and expansive state definitions of navigability, all square with
the thesis of this Article, that the public has recreational rights to any
suitable body of water. Moreover, a responsible program of public
226 See, e.g., In re Lennon, 166 U.S. 548 (1897) ; In re Reese, 107 F. 942 (8th
Cir.1901).
227 This suit could be either in the nature of a quiet title action to confirm the
newly asserted rights of use in the waterbody or a declaratory judgment action
seeking approval of a proposed regulatory/enforcement plan.
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rights would not likely constitute a taking of private rights under the
Supreme Court's recent Kaiser Aetna, Prune Yard, Allard, and Penn
Central decisions.
The key to an acceptable program of public recreational rights is gov-
ernmental responsibility. The inadequacies of market distribution of the
recreational resource make governmental action necessary, but govern-
ment must nevertheless act with an appropriate degree of self-restraint.
The suggested model seeks to avoid unnecessary unfairness to affected
private landowners and to protect the resource from overuse. Conse-
quently, decisions must be made by a visible and accountable decision-
maker on the bases of an adequate information base and some general
precepts concerning proper allocation. Finally, the model requires a
regulatory plan that will be enforced and therefore casts the regulatory
scheme into an injunctive setting by which those interested in regula-
tory enforcement could obtain the procedural and substantive benefits
of civil contempt actions.
The model which has emerged is no doubt open to criticism and sub-
sequent refinement. Nevertheless, the model has immediate value for it
demonstrates that there is a systematic and significant role for govern-
ment to play in responsibly acting to provide expanded opportunities
for recreational water use.
